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I. INTRODUCTION

N

aval mines are an extreme threat to innocent shipping. Indeed, not just
during armed conflicts, but also in times of peace (e.g., in the Red Sea in
1984) international shipping has suffered considerable losses by hitting naval
mines, whose presence had not been notified or which were “free-floating”
mines. In view of the importance of the freedom of navigation to the world
economy and international security, the naval mines threat—the “hidden
menace”1—seems to be intolerable. Therefore, the question arises whether
international law principles and rules provide effective protection of international shipping by prohibiting or restricting the use of these means of warfare.
It must not be forgotten, however, that today’s naval mines, which can
be programmed to hit only certain categories of ships or, if sufficient data
is available, even an individual ship, are highly discriminating weapons.2
The use of unanchored automatic submarine contact mines that do not
become harmless within one hour after they have been laid, and anchored
1. This quote is borrowed from MAURICE GRIFFITHS, THE HIDDEN MENACE (1981).
2. For a short overview of the technology currently in use, see HOWARD S. LEVIE,
MINE WARFARE AT SEA 97–115 (1992). For further details, see MALCOLM FULLER &
DAVID EWING, IHS JANE’S WEAPONS: NAVAL 2013–2014 (57th ed. 2013). See also John J.
Rios, Naval Mines in the 21st Century: Can NATO Navies Meet the Challenge? 11–15
(June 2005) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), available at
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/10018/05Jun%255FRios.pdf?sequenc
e=1.
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contact mines that do not become harmless as soon as they have broken
loose, is prohibited. However, even then such mines do not necessarily
pose an indiscriminate danger to innocent shipping because the “bow wave
brushes the mine clear of the ship.”3 Still, the fact that naval mines have
been laid in a given sea area—or even reasonable grounds for suspicion
that they may be present—will always have an impact on innocent shipping. Such shipping will either refrain from using the area or proceed with
utmost caution, thus extending the duration of the voyage. Because minesweeping and countermine operations are a very challenging, costly and
time-consuming task, even the availability of the necessary assets to undertake those operations does not mean that the mine threat can be quickly
and effectively eliminated.
This article focuses on two questions. The first concerns the exercise of
the belligerent right of minelaying and its impact on the freedom of navigation enjoyed by innocent, in particular neutral, shipping. In this context, a
brief discussion of the term “passage rights” is necessary. In the contemporary international law of the sea, the term is usually used for the rights of
innocent passage, transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage. During
international armed conflicts the belligerents will often not limit their operations to their national waters, but employ methods and means of naval
warfare, including naval mines, in high seas areas. Therefore, the term
“passage rights” is understood here in a broad sense, not including just
those rights, but as also including the freedom of navigation in sea areas
beyond the outer limits of the territorial sea. The starting point will be 1907
Hague Convention VIII.4 In a second step, the subsequent practice of
States will be analyzed with a view to establishing the contemporary law on
belligerent minelaying in the light of passage rights/freedom of navigation.
The law of neutrality, in particular the right of neutral States to lay mines in
their national waters, will be dealt with only marginally.
3. LEVIE, supra note 2, at 141, quoting a Report of Experts submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Corfu Channel case. See also J.S. COWIE, MINES, MINELAYERS AND MINELAYING 188–89 (1949).
4. Convention No. VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact
Mines, Oct 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2332, T.S. No. 541 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention
VIII]. Although the Convention is limited to automatic contact mines, there is wide
agreement that it is applicable to modern naval mines that are based on a different technology. See Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, The International Law of Mine Warfare at Sea, 23
ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 53 (1994), reprinted in 1 THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 53 (Michael N. Schmitt & Wolff
Heintschel von Heinegg eds., 2012).
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The second question concerns the laying of naval mines in times of
peace. Operations to lay mines are not easy, but rather are a timeconsuming task unless they are intended to hit vessels indiscriminately. A
State may therefore plan to lay mines well before the outbreak of an international armed conflict in order to be prepared to counter a threat. Moreover, it may wish to pursue its national security goals by denying others the
use of its territorial sea, including that overlapped by international straits,
and its archipelagic waters, including those within archipelagic sea lanes.
Seemingly, such minelaying might be considered as clearly illegal because of
the international law of the sea which, certainly during times of peace,
guarantees not only freedom of navigation in high seas areas, but also in
the territorial sea, international straits and archipelagic waters, while recognizing these sea areas are subject to the territorial sovereignty of the coastal
or archipelagic State. A closer examination shows that international law
provides no absolute prohibition on minelaying during peacetime.
II. THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT ON NAVAL MINES
AND PASSAGE RIGHTS
A. 1907 Hague Convention VIII and the Freedom of Navigation
One of the most difficult and contentious issues faced by the 1907 Hague
Peace Conference was the regulation of mine warfare at sea. In view of the
experience of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5)5 the delegates were prepared to assure “to pacific commerce an effectual protection”6 against the
effects of naval mines both during, and in the aftermath of, an international

5. The Russo-Japanese War was the first international armed conflict during which
naval mines were used extensively and which had long-lasting detrimental effects on shipping after the end of hostilities. See 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 471 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952); Roy F. Hoffmann, Offensive Mine Warfare:
A Forgotten Strategy?, 103 U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 143, 145 (May 1977); C.
JOHN COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 531 (6th rev. ed. 1968); ERIK
CASTRÉN, THE PRESENT LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY 275 (1954).
6. Committee of Examination, The Laying of Automatic Contact Mines: Report to
the Commission (Fifth Meeting, Sept. 17, 1907), reprinted in 3 THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES: TRANSLATION OF THE OFFICIAL TEXTS 399 (James B.
Scott ed., 1921) [hereinafter 1907 HAGUE PROCEEDINGS VOL. III].
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armed conflict.7 There was, however, no agreement as to how such protection should be accomplished.
Some delegations proposed far-reaching restrictions that would have
resulted in an almost absolute prohibition on minelaying in high seas areas
to safeguard the freedom of navigation of innocent, in particular neutral,
shipping.8 While some of those proposals were too ambitious to have a
realistic chance of being accepted by a sufficient number of delegations,9
there was a short period during which it seemed possible to arrive at a
compromise between those who were in favor of limiting the use of naval
mines to certain sea areas and those who wished to prevent such geographical limitations. The Committee of Examination, in its report to the Third
Commission, proposed four draft articles defining the sea areas in which
naval mines could be laid.10 The committee was guided by the wish to protect as far as possible innocent shipping without unduly depriving belligerents of the use of an effective, inexpensive means of naval warfare.11
7. For the various proposals, see id., Annexes 9–37, at 662–82. Worth mentioning is
the British proposal (Annex 9) according to which the use of automatic contact mines
would have been limited to the territorial seas of the belligerents. Only when laid off military ports could the distance be extended to ten nautical miles.
8. Id. It may be added that some of those proposals were far from altruistic or motivated by the wish to protect innocent shipping. In particular, States with large navies were
afraid that the use of naval mines could jeopardize their naval supremacy. “Behind the
proposals of the Conference stood the politics of force.” Juden Justice Reed, “Damn the
Torpedoes!”: International Standards Regarding the Use of Automatic Submarine Mines, 8 FORDHAM
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, 286, 294 (1984).
9. For instance, the Colombian delegation proposed the following:
The employment of anchored automatic mines is absolutely forbidden except as a means
of defense. Belligerents may not employ such mines except for the protection of their
own coasts and only within a distance of the greatest range of a cannon. In the case of
arms of the sea or navigable channels leading exclusively to the shores of a single Power,
that Power may bar the entrance for its own protection by laying automatic contact mines.
Belligerents are absolutely forbidden to lay anchored automatic contact mines in the open
sea or in the waters of the enemy.

1907 HAGUE PROCEEDINGS VOL. III, supra note 6, Annex 36, at 682.
10. Id., Annex 31, at 677. Articles 2 to 5 would have limited the right to lay mines to
the three-nautical mile territorial seas of the belligerents unless laid off military ports. In
the latter case the distance would extend up to ten nautical miles. There was, however, no
absolute prohibition of employing naval mines in high seas areas. According to Article 5,
the belligerents would have been entitled to lay automatic contact mines “within the
sphere of their immediate activity,” provided they became harmless “within two hours at
most after the person using them has abandoned them.”
11. On the other hand, we must take into account the incontestable fact that submarine
mines are a means of warfare the absolute prohibition of which can neither be hoped for
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Eventually, the draft articles that dealt with the sea areas in which
minelaying was to be limited did not obtain the necessary majority. The
Third Commission in its Report to the Conference emphasized:
By thus overturning, through the suppression of Articles 2 to 5, the decision which had seemed to obtain unanimous support in the committee
and according to which a restriction as to area in the use of anchored
mines ought to be expressly set forth in the regulations, there has been no
intention to swerve from the conviction that a restriction as to area also is
imposed upon the employment of such mines. The very weighty responsibility towards peaceful shipping assumed by the belligerent that lays
mines beyond his coastal waters has been several times placed in evidence, and it has been unanimously recognized that only “absolute urgent
military reasons” can justify such a usage with respect to anchored mines.
“Conscience, good sense, and the sentiment of duty imposed by the principle of humanity” will be the surest guide for the conduct of mariners of
all civilized nations; even without any written stipulation, there will surely
not be lacking in the minds of all the knowledge that the principle of the
liberty of the seas, with the obligations that it carries for those who make
use of this means of communication open to all peoples, is definitively
dedicated to humanity.12

This statement probably correctly reflected the general attitude of the
delegations present in The Hague. However, the 1907 Hague Convention
VIII contains no specific provision that prohibits or considerably restricts
the laying of mines in certain sea areas.13 Therefore, the general view is that
“Article 3 . . . allows the implication that, within the terms of the Convennor perhaps desired even in the interest of peace: they are, above all, a means of defense,
not costly but very effective, extremely useful to protect extended coasts, and adapted to
saving the considerable expense that the maintenance of great navies requires. . . . This
means that automatic contact mines are an indispensable weapon. Now to ask an absolute
prohibition of this weapon would consequently be demanding the impossible; it is necessary confine ourselves with regulating its use.

Committee of Examination, The Laying of Automatic Contact Mines: Report to the Third
Commission, supra note 6, at 399.
12. Third Commission, The Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines: Report
to the Conference (Presented at Eighth Plenary Meeting, Oct. 9, 1907), reprinted in 1 THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES: TRANSLATION OF THE OFFICIAL
TEXTS 280, 282 (James B. Scott ed., 1920) [hereinafter 1907 HAGUE PROCEEDINGS VOL.
I].
13. Article 2 prohibits the laying of mines off the enemy’s coats and ports only if it
serves the “sole object of intercepting commercial shipping.”
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tion, belligerents may sew [sic] anchored automatic contact mines anywhere
upon the high seas.”14 However, the preamble should be considered in a
systematic interpretation of the operative provisions. The preamble indicates that the parties were “inspired by the principle of the freedom of sea
routes, the common highway of all nations” and wished “to restrict and
regulate [the] employment [of automatic submarine contact mines] in order
to mitigate the severity of war and to ensure, as far as possible, to peaceful
navigation the security to which it is entitled, despite the existence of war.”
In view of this stated purpose, Article 3(1) can be interpreted as prohibiting
vast minefields in high seas areas if they disproportionally interfere with
freedom of navigation.15 The preamble is, however, subsidiary to the operative provisions, in particular Articles 1 and 3(2). In those, peaceful shipping
is protected only against anchored and unanchored mines that do not become harmless in accordance with Article 1(1) and (2). And the State’s obligation to render anchored mines harmless “should they cease to be under
surveillance” is far from absolute in character; Article 3 qualifies the obligation by requiring only that they “undertake to do their utmost.” The same
holds true for the obligation to notify ship owners of danger zones, the
requirement being subject to “military exigencies.” Moreover, the preamble
itself reveals that Hague Convention VIII does not provide “all the guarantees desirable.” Therefore, and in view of the drafting history, the provisions of the Convention cannot be interpreted as limiting the right of belligerents to use naval mines to certain sea areas or as prohibiting their use if
they unduly interfere with the freedom of navigation, in particular with
certain passage rights.
During the 1907 deliberations, the Netherlands delegation exerted considerable effort to obtain agreement to a prohibition on the laying of mines
in international straits. Originally, the Dutch delegation had proposed the
following provision: “In all cases straits uniting two open seas cannot be
barred.”16 Later, the Dutch delegation modified its proposal: “In any case,
the communication between two open seas cannot be barred entirely, and
14. ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA 303 (1955)
(Vol. 50, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies).
15. See, e.g., Reed who maintains that 1907 Hague Convention VIII created a standard
for the protection of neutral shipping that “should be interpreted from the viewpoint of a
neutral shipper.” Reed, supra note 8, at 301. However, he ignores the fact that the obligations of belligerents under Article 3(2) of the Convention are subject to feasibility and
military exigencies.
16. 1907 HAGUE PROCEEDINGS VOL. III, supra note 6, Annex 12, at 663.
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passage will be permitted only on conditions which are indicated by the
competent authorities.”17 Those proposals were rejected because “the proposal of the Netherlands met objections drawn from rights of territorial
sovereignty as well as from conventional stipulations existing on the subject of certain straits.”18
It follows from the text and drafting history that those delegates who
were opposed to an establishment of fixed limits within which mines could
be employed and who advocated the right of belligerents to make use of
anchored mines without restrictions as to place, even on the high seas,
eventually prevailed. Accordingly, under the 1907 Convention minelaying
could impede the customary right of innocent passage, even if exercised in
an international strait and on the freedom of navigation in high seas areas.19
Interestingly, the British delegate emphasized that “the right of the
neutral to security of navigation on the high seas ought to come before the
transitory right of the belligerent to employ these seas as a scene of operations of war” and he considered the Convention as constituting “only a
partial and inadequate solution of the problem.”20 Since the Convention
could not “be regarded as a complete exposition of the international law on
this subject,” it would “not be permissible to presume the legitimacy of an
action for the mere reason that this Convention has not prohibited it.”21
The German delegate responded by emphasizing that “a belligerent
who lays mines assumes a heavy responsibility towards neutrals and towards peaceful shipping” and that “no one will resort to this instrument of
warfare unless for military reasons of an absolutely urgent character,” but
it would be a great mistake to issue rules the strict observance of which
might be rendered impossible by the law of facts. It is of the first importance that the international maritime law . . . only contain clauses the
execution of which is possible from a military point of view—is possible

17. Id., Annex 22, at 671.
18. Committee of Examination, The Laying of Automatic Contact Mines: Report to
the Third Commission, supra note 6, at 408.
19. For further discussion of the Convention, see Steven Haines, 1907 Hague Convention VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, 90 INTERNATIONAL LAW
STUDIES 412 (2014).
20. Statement by Sir Ernest Satow, Delegate of Great Britain, at the Eighth Plenary
Meeting (Oct. 9, 1907). 1907 HAGUE PROCEEDINGS VOL. I, supra note 12, at 275.
21. Id.
551

International Law Studies

2014

even in exceptional circumstances. Otherwise the respect for law would
be lessened and its authority undermined.22

Despite the obvious disagreement regarding the right to use naval mines
in high seas areas, seemingly both delegates agreed that the laying of mines
that interfered with innocent, in particular neutral, shipping is subject to
considerations of military necessity “of an absolutely urgent character.” In
other words, minelaying in high seas areas would, according to both delegates, clearly be unlawful if not justified by a significant military advantage.23 Unfortunately, the words of the German delegate were vitiated
by the German practice of the First and Second World Wars.
B. Subsequent Practice and Developments
1. The Two World Wars
The belligerents of the two world wars resorted to a practice of almost
unrestricted mine warfare at sea.24 The disregard of 1907 Hague Convention VIII and the legitimate interests of neutral shipping was partially justified as a reprisal to allegedly prior unlawful conduct by the enemy.25 Therefore, the practice does not establish that the Convention had fallen into
desuetude.26 Rather, it proves that the belligerents accepted the obligation

22. Statement by Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, Delegate of Germany. Id. at 275,
76. He added that “military acts are not solely governed by stipulations of international
law. There are other factors: Conscience, good sense, and the sentiment of duty imposed
by principles of humanity will be the surest guides for the conduct of sailors and will constitute the most effective guaranty against abuses.”
23. But see TUCKER, supra note 14, at 303, who states that “it is only mine laying of an
openly indiscriminate character that is prohibited—i.e., mines sewn [sic] without regard to
any definite military operation save that of endangering all peaceful shipping, and without
any reasonable assurance of control or surveillance.”
24. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, at 473; COLOMBOS, supra note 5, at 533–34;
CASTRÉN, supra note 5, at 277; TUCKER, supra note 14, at 303–5; LEVIE, supra note 2, at
65–89.; COWIE, supra note 3, at 43–87, 119–65.
25. WILLIAM T. MALLISON JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: SUBMARINES IN GENERAL AND LIMITED WARS 68 (1968) (Vol. 56, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies).
26. For the contrary view, see Richard R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL
DES COURS, 25, 97 (1970).
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to issue appropriate warnings and to provide notifications of danger areas.27
Moreover, the practice of the Second World War—at least in its beginning—seems to support the view that, despite the lack of geographical limitations on the use of naval mines in the Convention, belligerents were prepared to either refrain from mining international straits or, if they had
mined such straits, to provide for piloting services in order to ensure a safe
passage.28 That practice conformed to the second Dutch proposal at the
1907 Hague Conference under which international straits could be mined if
provision is made for safe passage.29
2. Post-1945 Mining during International Armed Conflicts
In the post-Second World War era naval mines have been employed in
several instances. The first was the mining of the Corfu Channel in 1946.
Because Great Britain and Albania were not parties to an international
armed conflict, we will return to it, and the International Court of Justice
judgment that addressed it, later.30 Similarly, the mining of the Red Sea in
198431 is not relevant to this analysis as it did not occur during an armed
conflict.
Since the armed conflicts during which naval mines were used have
been addressed extensively elsewhere,32 it suffices here to highlight only
those aspects of the conflicts relevant to the examination of the relationship between the belligerent right to employ naval mines and the passage
rights of innocent neutral shipping. Hence, the Korean War (1950–53)33
need not be addressed because the mines laid off Wonsan to prevent an
amphibious landing operation resulted in no lasting impediment to passage
27. LEVIE, supra note 2, at 78–83. See also Reed, supra note 8, at 306 (who maintains
that the practice of the two world wars has contributed to a customary rule according to
which minefields in high seas areas must always be notified).
28. On April 9, 1940 the German government provided notification of a “mine warning area” in the Skagerrak between Lindesnes, Lodbjerg and Flekkeröy, Sandnäs Hage; on
September 3, 1939 regarding the Southern entrance of the Sound and the Great Belt; and
on April 29, 1940 regarding the Kattegat. The British government allowed passage
through the Strait of Dover and the Firth of Forth.
29. Supra note 17 and accompanying text.
30. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
31. See Scott C. Truver, Mines of August: an International Whodunit, 111 U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 95, 115–17 (May 1985).
32. See authorities cited infra notes 33–48.
33. See MALCOLM CAGLE & FRANK A. MANSON, THE SEA WAR IN KOREA 121–22
(1957).
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rights. The same holds true for the mining in 1972 of three North Vietnamese ports during the Vietnam War34 (although it is worth mentioning
that neutral ships were given a period of grace to leave35) and of the approaches to Port Stanley during the Falklands/Malvinas conflict (1982).36
During the 2011 conflict in Libya, Quaddafi’s forces laid mines off the port
of Misurata, probably in order to prevent food and other supplies from
reaching the city.37 This conduct was considered unlawful, not because of
its impact on the freedom of navigation, but because of its disregard for
humanitarian considerations and for UN Security Council Resolution 1973
which obliged Libyan authorities to “ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance.”38
The mining of the Suez Canal during the Arab-Israeli Wars (1967 and
1973) also need not be considered here because the Suez Canal is subject to
a special treaty regime39 and its passage is not governed by the law of the
sea. However, the 1973 conflict is notable in that both the Gulf of Suez
and the Gulf of Aqaba were closed by minefields.40 Interestingly, their closure attracted considerably less attention than did the closure of the Suez
Canal.
The use of naval mines during the 1971 India-Pakistan conflict still remains widely unnoticed even though at least five neutral merchant vessels
were sunk by mines.41 The mining of the Bay of Bengal by India and of the
delta of the Ganges River by Pakistan did not extend beyond the territorial

34. See LEVIE, supra note 2, at 144–57; Frank B. Swayze, Traditional Principles of Blockade
in Modern Practice: United States Mining of Internal and Territorial Waters of North Vietnam, 29
JAG JOURNAL 143 (1977).
35. Sally V. Mallison & William T. Mallison Jr., A Survey of the International Law of Naval
Blockade, 102 U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 43, 51 (Feb. 1976).
36. See LEVIE, supra note 2, at 159; William J. Fenrick, Legal Aspects of the Falklands Naval Conflict, 24 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 241 (1985).
37. See Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Methods and Means of Naval Warfare in NonInternational Armed Conflicts, NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 211, 217 (Kenneth Watkin & Andrew J. Norris eds., 2012) (Vol. 88, U.S.
Naval War College International Law Studies).
38. S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
39. Convention Respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal, Gr. Brit.Ger.-Austria-Hung.-Spain-Fr.-It.-Neth.-Russ.-Turk., Oct. 29, 1888, reprinted in 3 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 123 (1909).
40. See LEVIE, supra note 2, at 157–58.
41. See Jürgen Rohwer, Der indisch-pakistanische Konflikt 1971, 71 MARINE-RUNDSCHAU
7, 24–26 (1974).
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seas of the belligerents and had no broader impact on passage rights or on
the freedom of navigation.
The India-Pakistan conflict and the use of naval mines against Nicaraguan ports in 198442 support the position that the laying of mines in the
enemy’s territorial sea and internal waters is permissible under the law of
armed conflict. As has been rightly stated by Judge Schwebel in his dissent
the Nicaragua judgment, a “belligerent is entitled . . . to take reasonable
measures (a fortiori, within the internal waters of the opposing belligerent)
to restrict shipping, including third flag shipping, from using the ports of
its opponent. Thus the use of mines in hostilities is not of itself unlawful.”43 Judge Schwebel also emphasized, however, that
as against third States whose shipping was damaged or whose nationals
were injured by mines laid by or on behalf of the United States may arise,
the international responsibility of the United States may arise. Third
States were and are entitled to carry on commerce with Nicaragua and
their ships are entitled to make use of Nicaraguan ports. If the United
States were to be justified in taking blockade-like measures against Nicaraguan ports, as by mining, it could only be so if its mining . . . were publically and officially announced by it and if international shipping were
duly warned by it about the fact that mines would be or had been laid in
specified waters.44

The use of naval mines during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88)45 is the
most important post-Second World War armed conflict in which the question of the legality of belligerent interference with the freedom of navigation of neutral shipping has arisen. In response to the laying of naval mines
in the Persian Gulf, the international community made use of a variety of
measures to enforce the right of freedom of navigation, ranging from con-

42. For the facts established by the ICJ, see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 76–80 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. See also LEVIE, supra note 2, at 162–66.
43. Nicaragua, supra note 42, ¶ 236 (Schwebel, J., dissenting opinion).
44. Id., ¶ 238.
45. For a comprehensive analytical assessment of the legal issues of the Iran-Iraq
War, see the contributions in THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980–1988) AND THE LAW OF NAVAL
WARFARE (Andrea de Guttry & Nattalino Ronzitti eds., 1993); THE GULF WAR OF 1980–
1988 (Ige F. Dekker & Harry H.G. Post eds., 1992).
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voying their merchant vessels46 and minesweeping operations47 to the use
of force against Iranian vessels that had been caught laying unanchored
mines and two oil platforms that had been used as bases for operations.48
These enforcement measures were considered lawful as either self-defense
actions or countermeasures in response to the illegal use by Iran of unanchored mines and of non-notified anchored mines. It may be concluded,
therefore, that had Iran refrained from the use of unanchored mines and
had it properly provided notification of the minefields, the international
community’s response to the mining activities would not have been based
on the illegality of the Iranian conduct. Thus, the international community’s rationale for the actions taken does not support a conclusion that the
mining of the Persian Gulf was unlawful per se.
An important facet of the Iran-Iraq conflict concerns the status of the
Strait of Hormuz and the question of whether during an international
armed conflict mines may be laid in international straits. In October 1982,
the Iranian government, in a letter to the UN Security Council declared:
As certain rumours have been spread concerning the Straits of Hormuz,
which might disturb international navigation in that area, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms that Iran is
committed to keeping the Straits open to navigation and will not spare
any effort for the purpose of achieving this end.49

This statement is remarkable in that Iran has consistently taken the position that the regime of transit passage set forth in Article 38 of the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea50 does not apply to the
Strait of Hormuz because Iran has merely signed, not ratified, the Conven-

46. Myron H. Nordquist & Margaret G. Wachenfeld, Legal Aspects of Reflagging Kuwaiti
Tankers and Laying of Mines in the Persian Gulf, 31 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 138 (1988).
47. Nattalino Ronzitti, La Guerre du Golfe, le Déminage at la Circulation des Navires, 33
ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 647 (1987).
48. For the facts established by the ICJ, see Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J.
161, ¶¶ 23–25 (Nov. 6). See also LEVIE, supra note 2, at 166–70.
49. U.N. Security Council, Charge D’Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Iran, Letter dated Oct. 21, 1980 from the Charge D’Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Iran to
the United Nations to the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. S/14226 (Oct. 22, 1980).
50. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. The Convention entered into force on November 16, 1994.
As of November 12, 2014, 166 States, including the Holy See, are parties to it.
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tion.51 At the same time, the statement does not necessarily establish that
Iran will not take belligerent (or peacetime) measures that would prevent or
impede passage through the Strait of Hormuz and, thus, Iran’s acceptance
of a legal obligation to refrain from such actions.
3. Some Preliminary Conclusions
Subject to further matters that will be considered in the following section,
the 1907 Hague Convention VIII and State practice seem to indicate that
during an international armed conflict the belligerents are entitled to lay
naval mines in all sea areas beyond the national waters (i.e., internal waters,
territorial sea and archipelagic waters) of neutral States. Accordingly, there
is no prohibition on impeding innocent passage in the territorial seas of the
belligerents as long as the closure has been properly notified in advance.
51. Upon signature, Iran made the following declaration:
Notwithstanding the intended character of the Convention being one of general application and of law making nature, certain of its provisions are merely product of quid pro quo
which do not necessarily purport to codify the existing customs or established usage
(practice) regarded as having an obligatory character. Therefore, it seems natural and in
harmony with article 34 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that only
states parties to the Law of the Sea Convention shall be entitled to benefit from the contractual rights created therein.
The above considerations pertain specifically (but not exclusively) to the following:
– The right of Transit passage through straits used for international navigation (Part III,
Section 2, article 38).

Declarations and Statements, OCEANS & LAW OF THE SEA, UNITED NATIONS, available at ww
w.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm (than follow
Iran hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 12, 2014).
It should also be noted that Oman, which borders the Strait of Hormuz as well, neither explicitly accepts nor rejects the applicability of the transit passage regime. Upon
signature, Oman declared:
It is the understanding of the Government of the Sultanate of Oman that the application
of the provisions of articles 19, 25, 34, 38 and 45 of the Convention does not preclude a
coastal State from taking such appropriate measures as are necessary to protect its interest
of peace and security.

Id. (then follow Oman upon signature hyperlink).
Upon ratification on August 17, 1989, Oman declared that the
Sultanate of Oman exercises full sovereignty over its territorial sea, the space above the
territorial sea and its bed and subsoil, pursuant to the relevant laws and regulations of the
Sultanate and in conformity with the provisions of this Convention concerning the principle of innocent passage.

Id. (then follow Oman upon ratification/accession hyperlink).
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While there is no State practice involving archipelagic States, it is safe to
conclude that the same holds true for those parts of belligerent archipelagic
waters in which only the right of innocent passage (as distinct from the
right of archipelagic sea lanes passage) applies.52
International straits overlapped by the territorial seas of the belligerents
are not absolutely excluded from mining. Hence, naval mines may be laid
in belligerent international straits as long as the belligerent has given prior
notice and ensures a means of safe passage, e.g., by providing piloting services or by temporarily disarming the mines. It remains to be seen whether
the provisions of UNCLOS Article 38 on transit passage have contributed
to an extended protection of such straits.
Minelaying in high seas areas (i.e., sea areas beyond the outer limit of
the territorial sea) is not prohibited, again as long as the belligerent has
notified the minefield in a timely and appropriate manner.53 However, in
view of the continuing right of neutral shipping to use the high seas for
legitimate purposes, the legality of any employment of naval mines depends
upon its justification by military necessity considerations. The laying of
extensive minefields or their maintenance over a long period of time will
not be in compliance with the law of naval warfare if there is no legitimate
military necessity that justifies depriving neutral shipping of the freedom of
navigation given its importance to international trade and the world economy.
Finally, and for the sake of completeness, it should be added that neutral States are entitled to lay mines off their coasts to defend their national
waters and territories against belligerent interference.54 Such mining must
be limited to the territorial sea and may not extend to international straits
or archipelagic sea lanes unless it does not suspend, hamper or otherwise
impede the rights of transit passage or archipelagic sea lanes passage.55 Notification of the laying of armed mines and the arming of pre-laid mines in
neutral national waters is required.

52. See UNCLOS, supra note 50, art. 52.
53. For a similar assessment of the prior notification requirement, see Reed, supra
note 8, at 306–7 (who rightly maintains that during the two world wars all “war zones,”
including those enforced by the use of naval mines, had been notified by the belligerents.).
54. 1907 Hague Convention VIII, supra note 4, art. 4.
55. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA ¶ 29 (Louise Doswald Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter SRM].
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C. Belligerent Minelaying and Passage Rights: Contemporary Law
The 1907 Hague Convention VIII does not provide a comprehensive legal
framework on minelaying during an international armed conflict since its
scope of applicability ratione materiae is limited to “automatic submarine
contact mines.” Although it is possible to deduce from the Convention a
number of principles that also apply to modern naval mines,56 an identification of contemporary international law is not limited to a dynamic interpretation of the Convention. Rather, it is indispensable to also consider those
publications that shed light on what States are willing to accept as the current state of the law applicable to minelaying during international armed
conflicts. These include the San Remo Manual,57 as well as the military manuals of the U.S. Navy,58 Canada,59 the United Kingdom60 and Germany.61
While the manuals selected for examination is rather limited, there are two
reasons why they may still serve as reference points. First, the U.S. Navy
manual (NWP 1-14M) has been adopted by a number of other States,
which consider its provisions to correctly reflect the current state of the
law. Second, these manuals are the most current statements on the international law applicable to mine warfare.
1. Access to and from Neutral Waters
In accordance with the law of maritime neutrality prohibiting the conduct
of hostilities in neutral waters, there is a clear prohibition on laying naval
mines in waters subject to national sovereignty, i.e., the internal waters,
56. See Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 4, at 59–70.
57. SRM, supra note 55. See also the related Explanation, which provides additional
detail concerning each of the Manual’s basic rules.
58. U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 512/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS (2007) [hereinafter NWP 1-14M].
59. CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF (CANADA), B-GJ-005-104/FP-021, LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS (2001) [hereinafter
CANADIAN MANUAL].
60. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT (2004) [hereinafter UK MANUAL].
61. BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER VERTEIDIGUNG, ZDV 15/2, HUMANITÄRES VÖLKERRECHT IN BEWAFFNETEN KONFLIKTEN (2013) [hereinafter GERMAN MANUAL]. An English translation is available at the U.S. Naval War College Stockton e-Portal,
http://usnwc.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=5616055 (last visited Dec. 6, 2014).
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territorial sea and archipelagic waters of neutral States.62 Although it is lawful to conduct hostilities, including minelaying, in the sea areas beyond the
outer limits of the territorial sea, that is, in neutral exclusive economic
zones (EEZ) and the high seas, access to and exit from neutral waters may
not be barred. As stated in three of the manuals, mining of those sea areas
“shall not have the practical effect of preventing passage between neutral
waters and international waters.”63 Accordingly, the belligerent that lays
mines off a neutral’s coast is obliged to provide for safe routes through the
minefield, e.g., by leaving open convenient channels or by providing piloting services. It must be emphasized, however, that the laying of mines in
close proximity to a neutral territorial sea will be lawful only in exceptional
circumstances, for example, in a confined sea area that is used by the enemy.
2. Belligerent National Waters and the Right of Innocent Passage
According to all the manuals, belligerent national waters, which are its internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea, are “areas of naval warfare.”64 Hence, there is no prohibition on mining a State’s own or enemy
national waters. This right was acknowledged at the 1907 Hague Peace
Conference. The impact of mining these waters on the right of innocent
passage is a deplorable—but necessary—consequence of an international
armed conflict. Neutral shipping’s only protection is to avoid belligerent
national waters. It may be added that UNCLOS Article 25(3) provides that
in times of peace States are entitled to suspend innocent passage “if such
suspension is essential for its security.” This right, which only the coastal
State concerned may exercise, is limited to specified areas of the territorial
sea. During an international armed conflict, it is modified by the law of
naval warfare which supersedes the peacetime rules of the law of the sea.
However, the minelaying-State is obliged, “when the mining is first executed,” to provide “for free exit of shipping of neutral States.”65 This, by ne62. SRM, supra note 55, ¶¶ 15, 16, 86; NWP 1-14M, supra note 58, ¶¶ 7.3, 9.2.3; CAMANUAL, supra note 59, ¶¶ 805, 806; UK MANUAL, supra note 60, ¶¶ 13.8, 13.9,
13.58; GERMAN MANUAL, supra note 61, ¶¶ 1205, 1214, 1216.
63. SRM, supra note 55, ¶ 87; CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 59, ¶ 839; UK MANUAL, supra note 60, ¶ 13.59.
64. SRM, supra note 55, ¶ 10; CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 59, ¶ 703(1); UK
MANUAL, supra note 60, ¶ 13.6; GERMAN MANUAL, supra note 61, ¶ 1011.
65. SRM, supra note 55, ¶ 85; CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 59, ¶ 836 UK MANUAL,
supra note 60, ¶ 13.57.
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cessity, implies that there is an obligation on the minelaying-State to notify
“the laying of armed mines or the arming of pre-laid mines, unless the
mines can only detonate against vessels which are military objectives.”66
Hence, the presence of highly sophisticated and discriminating modern
mines need not be notified because, by their design, they do not pose a risk
to innocent shipping and thus do not impede the exercise of the right of
innocent passage.
3. Transit Passage and Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage through Belligerent
Waters
As has been seen, the 1907 Hague Convention VIII does not contain a
prohibition on laying mines in international straits. With the acceptance in
UNCLOS of a twelve nautical mile territorial sea, many international straits
that had contained high seas corridors when the maximum breadth of the
territorial sea was three nautical miles are today overlapped by the territorial seas of the States bordering the strait. Similarly, sea lanes through an
archipelagic State, which were located in international waters prior to the
adoption of UNCLOS, are now in archipelagic waters over which the archipelagic State enjoys sovereignty. In order to preserve the freedoms of
navigation and overflight, UNCLOS provides for the rights of transit passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage and non-suspendable innocent passage.67 Although UNCLOS is a peacetime instrument, these provisions
have had a remarkable impact on the law of naval warfare. This, however,

66. SRM, supra note 55, ¶ 83; CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 59, ¶ 838; UK MANUsupra note 60, ¶ 13.55. According to NWP 1-14M, supra note 58, ¶ 9.2.3, international
notification must be made only, “as soon as military exigencies permit.” It is unclear
whether the United States believes the safety of neutral shipping is subsidiary to considerations of military necessity. However, a minefield most often serves the purpose of “modifying geography” and of preventing other vessels from using a certain area of the seas.
This can be accomplished only, if the respective minefield is notified in advance. The
German Manual does not expressly mention notification. However, according to paragraph 1046, any minelaying is subject to the principles of effective surveillance, risk control and warning. The latter implies an obligation to notify the laying of armed mines or
the arming of pre-laid mines.
67. UNCLOS, supra note 50, arts. 38, 45, 53. In archipelagic waters that are not subject to the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage, other States enjoy the right of innocent
passage, which, according to UNCLOS Article 52(2), may be suspended temporarily in
specified areas.
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does not mean that the peacetime rules have made their way into the law of
naval warfare in an unmodified fashion.68
Before elaborating on the rules of naval warfare on the mining of international straits and archipelagic sea lanes, it is important to stress that
the right to extend the breadth of the territorial sea a maximum width of
twelve nautical miles was part and parcel of a “package deal.”69 In other
words, a coastal State that extends its territorial sea to twelve nautical miles
is under a clear obligation to grant other States the right of transit passage
through now overlapped international straits. The same holds true for archipelagic waters, whose recognition was subject to an archipelagic State’s
acceptance of the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage. Therefore, States
bordering an international State and archipelagic States are bound by these
special regimes,70 and any declaration reducing the rights of other States to
innocent passage, which may be suspended, are unlawful under UNCLOS.
The main characteristics of the rights of transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage are that they may not be suspended or impeded, and
that the coastal or archipelagic State is under an obligation not to hamper
passage and to give appropriate publicity to any danger.71 During an international armed conflict, these provisions apply to belligerent international
straits and archipelagic waters, but only in a modified manner.
Under the law of naval warfare, belligerent international straits and archipelagic sea lanes are within “areas of warfare.”72 Thus, despite their importance to international shipping, there is no prohibition on laying mines
in those areas. While the prohibition on impeding the rights of transit and
archipelagic sea lanes passage continues to apply during international
68. SRM, supra note 55, ¶ 27, provides “[t]he rights of transit passage and archipelagic
sea lanes passage applicable to international straits and archipelagic waters in peacetime
continue to apply in times of armed conflict.” While this statement is correct insofar as
neutral sea areas are concerned, it is highly questionable whether it also holds true for
belligerent international straits and archipelagic sea lanes because there is no obligation of
a belligerent to grant the enemy those passage rights.
69. For a discussion of the “package deal” reached during the negotiations that produced UNCLOS, see James Kraska, Legal Vortex in the Strait of Hormuz, 54 VIRGINIA
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 323, 354-57 (2014). Its intent was to balance the interests of flag, port and coastal States.
70. The declarations by Iran and Oman concerning the Strait of Hormuz, supra note
51, have, therefore, not prevented an application of the transit passage regime to that
international strait.
71. UNCLOS, supra note 50, arts. 38, 44, 53, 54.
72. See authorities cited supra note 65. For the status of neutral international straits
and archipelagic sea lanes, see SRM, supra note 55, ¶¶ 23–30.
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armed conflicts, the belligerents are entitled to mine international straits
and archipelagic sea lanes if they provide for “safe and convenient alternative routes.”73
The provisions of the UK Manual and NWP 1-14M do not fully reflect
that position. According to the UK Manual, the safe and convenient rule
only applies to archipelagic sea lanes.74 As regards international straits, the
prohibition of impeding the right of transit passage is absolute in character.75 NWP 1-14M provides, “[n]aval mines may be employed to channelize
neutral shipping but not in a manner to deny transit passage of international straits or archipelagic sea lanes passage of archipelagic waters by such
shipping.”76 The term “impede” means “to delay or block the progress or
action of.”77 The term “deny” means “to refuse to give.”78 Obviously, the
NWP 1-14M-provision is less limiting with regard to the right of a belligerent to mine its international straits than the UK Manual-provision. Although not using the same language, it seems to reach the same result as the
San Remo Manual and German and Canadian manuals, that is, a denial of
passage rights to neutral shipping will be unlawful, but that impeding those
rights, while simultaneously providing safe and convenient alternative
routes, would be lawful.
The UK Manual provision concerning transit passage cannot be reconciled with that of the other manuals. It introduces the strict peacetime
standards for international straits, while providing no exception for belligerent actions during international armed conflicts. It is doubtful that this
standard is part of the law of naval warfare. Applied to the United Kingdom, for example, it would mean that, as a party to an international armed
conflict, the United Kingdom would be obliged to permit unimpeded passage through the Strait of Dover and to refrain from channelizing neutral
73. SRM, supra note 55, ¶ 89; CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 59, ¶ 841. According to
the GERMAN MANUAL, supra note 61, ¶ 1046, there seems to be no prohibition of mining
international straits and archipelagic sea lanes either. The obligation of belligerents to take
all feasible precautionary measures for the protection of peaceful shipping seems to suggest that it includes the provision of safe and convenient alternative routes.
74. UK MANUAL, supra note 60, ¶ 13.61 (“Passage through waters subject to the right
of archipelagic sea lanes passage shall not be impeded unless safe and convenient alternative routes are provided.”).
75. Id., ¶ 13.61 (“Transit passage shall not be impeded.”).
76. NWP 1-14M, supra note 58, ¶ 9.2.3(6).
77. CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 713 (Angus Stevenson & Maurice
Waite eds., 12th ed. 2011).
78. Id. at 383.
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shipping by the laying of mines. In practice, however, since the UK Manual
provides for exceptions in the case of mines that “can only detonate
against vessels which are military objectives,”79 it is safe to conclude that
the United Kingdom is prepared to use these highly sophisticated weapons
in both its own and enemy international straits because they will not “impede” transit passage.
Finally, while the law of naval warfare establishes the basic framework
for the conduct of war at sea, individual States are, of course, free to deliberately apply stricter standards to their belligerent activities than those provided for by international law. Thus, a State could refrain from laying
mines in its own international straits or that of its enemy as a matter of
policy even though safe and convenient alternative routes are available.
4. Neutral Navigation in International Waters
As stated above, high seas freedom of navigation is not a “passage right” in
the strict sense. Still, in view of its importance to the world economy and
international security, it is necessary to briefly touch upon the legality of
mining operations in international waters (i.e., sea areas beyond the outer
limits of the territorial sea) in light of the rights neutral States enjoy in
those waters. In doing so, it is important to distinguish between the high
seas in the technical sense (which are those areas not included in an EEZ,
or in the territorial, internal or archipelagic waters of a State) and those
parts of international waters that are subject to EEZ and continental shelf
rights of neutral States.
The conduct of hostilities within the EEZ or on the continental shelf
of neutral States is not prohibited;80 however, the belligerents are under an
obligation to pay due regard to the rights coastal States enjoy in those areas.81 If a belligerent considers it necessary to lay mines in the EEZ or on
the continental shelf of a neutral State, it is obligated not to “interfere with
79. UK MANUAL, supra note 60, ¶ 13.55.
80. SRM, supra note 55, ¶¶ 10(c), 34, 35; NWP 1-14M, supra note 58, ¶ 7.3.8; CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 59, ¶¶ 804 (1)(c), 821, 822; UK MANUAL, supra note 60, ¶¶
13.6(b), 13.21; GERMAN MANUAL, supra note 61, ¶¶ 1011, 1014, 1016. For an analysis of
the relationship between the law of the sea and the law of naval warfare, see Wolff
Heintschel von Heinegg, UNCLOS and Maritime Security Operations, 48 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 151 (2005).
81. SRM, supra note 55, ¶ 34; NWP 1-14M, supra note 58, ¶ 7.3.8; CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 59, ¶ 821; UK MANUAL, supra note 60, ¶ 12.21; GERMAN MANUAL, supra
note 61, ¶ 1014.
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access” to artificial islands, installations and structures.82 Moreover, the
“size of the minefield and the type of mines used [shall] not endanger”
such installations.83 Accordingly, the minelaying-State is under an affirmative obligation to provide for free access routes to and from such installations, and to refrain from all activities that may have a detrimental effect on
such structures.
The due regard principle for neutral States engaged in the exploration
and exploitation of natural resources also applies in sea and sea-bed areas
beyond national jurisdiction, i.e., the high seas and the sea-bed thereunder.84 Since neutral States continue to enjoy the freedom of navigation in
high seas areas (including the EEZ and over the continental shelf) and in
view of the importance of that right, a mining of high sea areas not justified
by reasons of military necessity will certainly be in violation of the contemporary law of naval warfare. Hence, expansive minefields of the kind established during the two world wars would clearly be unlawful. As stated in
NWP 1-14M, under the current law of naval warfare the “mining of areas
of indefinite extent in international waters is prohibited. Reasonably limited
barred areas may be established by naval mines, provided neutral shipping
retains an alternate route around or through such an area with reasonable
assurance of safety.”85 Any mining of high seas areas that does not conform to these standards will certainly no longer be tolerated by the international community.
D. Notification
One of the preconditions a State engaged in minelaying must fulfill for it to
be lawful is providing notification.86 The obligation to notify is no longer
limited to situations in which the mines “cease to be under surveillance”
and it is no longer subject to “military exigencies.”87 Although NWP 1-14M
provides that “international notification of the location of emplaced mines
must be made as soon as military exigencies permit,”88 it is hard to con82. SRM, supra note 55, ¶ 35; CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 59, ¶ 822; UK MANUsupra note 60, ¶ 13.21.
83. SRM, supra note 55, ¶ 35.
84. SRM, supra note 55, ¶ 36; CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 59, ¶ 823; UK MANUAL, supra note 60, ¶ 13.22; GERMAN MANUAL, supra note 61, ¶ 1015.
85. NWP 1-14M, supra note 58, ¶ 9.2.3(8).
86. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. See also Reed, supra note 8, at 306–7.
87. 1907 Hague Convention VIII, supra note 4, art. 3.
88. NWP 1-14M, supra note 58, ¶ 9.2.3(1).
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ceive of exigencies that would permit a belligerent to refrain from providing notice of the laying of mines. Additionally, since publicity is necessary
in order to achieve the aims of a minefield, i.e., denying the enemy the use
of the mined sea area, it is in the belligerent’s interest to provide notification. It is important to note that the obligation to notify is limited to the
laying of armed mines and to the arming of pre-laid mines.89 Hence, the
laying of unarmed mines need not be notified. This is also the rule for
highly sophisticated naval mines that “can only detonate against vessels
which are military objectives.”90 Finally, the communication of the notification “to the Governments through the diplomatic channel”91 is no longer
required under the contemporary law; today it suffices to use a Notice to
Mariners.
E. Demining Operations by Neutral States
Finally, while to this point the analysis has focused on a belligerent’s minelaying, the response of neutral States to that mining also merits discussion.
Neutral States will no longer tolerate mining operations that pose an intolerable threat to the freedom of navigation in sea areas beyond the outer
limit of the territorial seas of the parties to the conflict if the mines have
been laid in violation of the law of naval warfare. The demining operations
conducted by neutral States in the Persian Gulf92 have generally been considered as in compliance with international law, in particular with the law of
maritime neutrality.93 The San Remo Manual provides, “[n]eutral States do
not commit an act inconsistent with the laws of neutrality by clearing mines
laid in violation of international law.”94 States have adopted this rule in
their military manuals.95 Accordingly, neutral States are entitled to enforce
the freedom of navigation, including passage rights, if a belligerent unduly
interferes with those rights, e.g., by mining areas of indefinite extent. However, a word of caution is necessary. A demining operation by neutral
89. See SRM, supra note 55, ¶ 83.
90. Id.
91. 1907 Hague Convention VIII, supra note 4, art. 3.
92. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
93. See Ronzitti, supra note 47; Andrea Gioia & Natalino Ronzitti, The Law of Neutrality: Third States’ Commercial Rights and Duties, in THE GULF WAR OF 1980–1988, supra note 45,
221, at 237–38.
94. SRM, supra note 55, ¶ 92.
95. CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 59, ¶ 843; UK MANUAL, supra note 60, ¶ 13.64;
GERMAN MANUAL, supra note 61, ¶ 1245.
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States will most certainly be regarded as assisting the opposing belligerent
or even an act of “direct participation in hostilities”96 because it would deprive the minelaying-State of the military advantage linked to the mining.
Therefore, any demining operation based upon the alleged unlawfulness of
a minefield must be approached cautiously and preferably conducted in a
multinational context vice unilaterally to establish international legitimacy.
III. PEACETIME MINING
Two States, the United States and Germany, which have officially stated
their policy, have taken the position that mining operations are not absolutely prohibited in peacetime, particularly when in pursuit of national security interests. Moreover, an analysis of the Corfu Channel case reveals that,
according to the International Court of Justice, a coastal State may indeed
lay mines in its territorial sea in peacetime.
Notwithstanding this interpretation, the employment of naval mines in
times of peace seems to be contrary to the international law of the sea because their presence—or the mere suspicion of their presence—in a sea
area will necessarily have an impeding effect on the exercise of passage
rights and the freedom of navigation. Furthermore, developments of the
international law of the sea since the Court’s 1949 judgment make it questionable whether the use of mines in times of peace can still be considered
lawful.
In addressing this issue, only situations that involve a conduct attributable to a State will be considered. Incidents such as the mining of the Red
Sea in 1984, which could not be attributed with sufficient certainty to a
State,97 will not be addressed.
A. National Positions on Peacetime Mining Operations
The German Manual, by adopting NATO doctrine, distinguishes between
protective, defensive and offensive minelaying.98 A “protective minefield”
96. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE
ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 41–68 (2009).
97. There were allegations that the mines had been laid by Libya, although the terrorist group of the Islamic Jihad had claimed it laid the mines. See LEVIE, supra note 2, at 159–
62 and the authorities he cites.
98. GERMAN MANUAL, supra note 61, ¶ 1045.
567

International Law Studies

2014

is defined as “a minefield laid in friendly territorial waters to protect ports,
harbours, anchorages, coasts and coastal routes.”99 A “defensive minefield”
is a “minefield laid in international waters or international straits with the
declared intention of controlling shipping in defence of sea communications.”100 An “offensive minefield” is defined as a “minefield laid in enemy
territorial water or waters under enemy control.”101 According to the German Manual, a resort to protective minelaying prior to the outbreak of an
international armed conflict is permitted if the right of foreign ships to
innocent passage is observed, and as long as the minelaying-State exercises
sufficient control over the mines. The German Manual continues by repeating almost verbatim UNCLOS Article 25(3), in stating the coastal State
may suspend temporarily in specified parts of its territorial sea the innocent
passage of foreign ships if that is essential for the protection of its security
and only after international shipping has been duly warned.102 According to
the Manual, protective mining of international straits is explicitly prohibited
in times of peace; defensive and offensive minelaying is not permissible in
situations other than armed conflict.103
The United States has given a more detailed statement of its policy on
peacetime mining, which is quoted in its entirety as follows:
Consistent with the safety of its own citizenry, a nation may emplace both
armed and controlled mines in its own internal waters at any time with or
without notification. A nation may also mine its own archipelagic waters
and territorial sea during peacetime when deemed necessary for national
security purposes. If armed mines are emplaced in archipelagic waters or
the territorial sea, appropriate international notification of the existence
and location of such mines is required. Because the right of innocent passage can be suspended only temporarily, armed mines must be removed
or rendered harmless as soon as the security threat that prompted their
emplacement has terminated. Armed mines may not be emplaced in international straits or archipelagic sea lanes during peacetime. Emplacement of controlled mines in a nation’s own archipelagic waters or territorial sea is not subject to such notification or removal requirements.

99. NATO STANDARDIZATION
AND DEFINITIONS 2-P-10 (2014).

AGENCY, AAP-06, NATO GLOSSARY OF TERMS

100. Id. at 2-D-3.
101. Id. at 2-O-1
102. GERMAN MANUAL, supra note 61, ¶ 1047.
103. Id., ¶¶ 1049, 1050.
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Naval mines may not be emplaced in internal waters, territorial seas, or
archipelagic waters of another nation in peacetime without that nation’s
consent. Controlled mines may, however, be emplaced in international
waters (i.e., beyond the territorial sea) if they do not unreasonably interfere with other lawful uses of the oceans. The determination of what constitutes an “unreasonable interference” involves a balancing of a number
of factors, including the rationale for their emplacement (i.e., the selfdefense requirements of the emplacing nation), the extent of the area to
be mined, the hazard (if any) to other lawful ocean uses, and the duration
of their emplacement. Because controlled mines do not constitute a hazard to navigation, international notice of their emplacement is not required.
Armed mines may not be emplaced in international waters prior to the
outbreak of armed conflict, except under the most demanding requirements of individual or collective self-defense. Should armed mines be
emplaced in international waters under such circumstances, prior notification of their location must be provided. A nation emplacing armed mines
in international waters during peacetime must maintain an on-scene presence in the area sufficient to ensure that appropriate warning is provided
to ships approaching the danger area. All armed mines must be expeditiously removed or rendered harmless when the imminent danger that
prompted their emplacement has passed.104

Germany and the United States agree that it is permissible, if essential
or necessary for national security purposes, to mine its own national waters. In principle, prior notification is required unless the mines can be sufficiently controlled so as not to pose a threat to innocent shipping. Although the German Manual does not distinguish between armed and controlled mines, its reference to an exercise of “sufficient control”105 leads to
the conclusion that notification is unnecessary in the case of controlled
mines. The manuals differ, however, with regard to the mining of international straits and archipelagic sea lanes. Whereas the German Manual prohibits the laying of any mines in those areas, NWP 1-14M appears to accept that controlled mines (as distinguished from armed mines) may be laid
in both international straits and archipelagic sea lanes.
Both States agree offensive minelaying during peacetime is prohibited.
The United States provides for an exception if the State in whose waters
104. NWP 1-14M, supra note 58, ¶ 9.2.2.
105. GERMAN MANUAL, supra note 61, ¶ 1047.
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the mines will be laid has given its consent; the German Manual does not
contain this exception. The German Manual, however, obviously starts
from the premise that offensive mining is characterized by the lack of consent. Hence, if the State concerned consents, the mining will not be “offensive’’ and, taking into account “circumstance precluding wrongfulness,”
will not be considered a violation of the State’s territorial sovereignty and
integrity.
There also seems to be a significant difference between the manuals
with regard to mining in international waters. According to the German
Manual, the mining of sea areas beyond the outer limit of Germany’s territorial sea is impermissible in peacetime, whether with armed or controlled
mines. According to the U.S. position, it is permissible to lay controlled
mines at all times and to lay armed mines, if “demanding requirements of
individual or collective self-defense” justify such conduct, the mines are
notified and are sufficiently controlled. However, this apparent difference
is less significant when it is realized that the applicability of the German
Manual, despite its reference to peacetime mining, is limited to times of
armed conflict. There are no indications that the German government has
intended to limit its options under the right of individual or collective selfdefense, i.e., under the jus ad bellum. It may be concluded, therefore, that
both States generally share a common position on the legality of peacetime
mining operations, subject to the difference on the issue of the peacetime
mining of international straits. But even that distinction is a minor one if
the right of self-defense comes into play. Insofar as highly sophisticated
and discriminating naval mines are concerned, it is quite improbable that
the German government would be willing to waive its right to counter an
armed attack or imminent armed attack solely because the only effective
response is to employ mines in an international strait.
B. The Corfu Channel Judgment
The U.S. and German positions on peacetime mining are reconcilable with
the Corfu Channel case.106 The Court did not rule that the mining of the Albanian territorial waters as such was in violation of international law. It may
be added that—for obvious reasons—the Court was unaware of the regime
of transit passage. Although it indicated the North Corfu Channel belonged to that class of “international highways” through which passage
106. Corfu Channel, supra note 30.
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could not be prohibited during peacetime,107 the judgment is not necessarily
significant with regard to the special legal status of international straits as
established by UNCLOS.
Albania was held responsible for the damage inflicted on the British
warships only because it had positive or constructive knowledge of the
presence of mines that were armed, thus posing a considerable hazard to
international shipping.108 Because of that knowledge, Albania was obliged
to notify “for the benefit of shipping in general, the existence of a minefield in Albanian territorial waters” and to warn “the approaching British
warships of the imminent danger to which the minefield exposed them.” 109
According to the Court, such
obligations are based, not on the Hague Convention of 1907, No. VIII,
which is applicable in time of war, but on certain general and wellestablished principles, namely: elementary considerations of humanity,
even more exacting in peace than in war; the principle of the freedom of
maritime communication; and every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
States.110

Had the Albanian authorities lacked positive or constructive
knowledge, there would have been no obligation to warn international
shipping. Moreover, the Court started from the premise that the mines
were indeed dangerous. It did not need to address the issue of controlled
mines that, if not armed, do not pose a danger to international shipping.
The approach taken by both the United States and Germany on peacetime
mining of the territorial sea is consistent with the Court’s holdings because
both States agree that they are obliged to issue warnings if the mines pose a
threat to international shipping.
C. Peacetime Mining and UNCLOS Navigational Provisions
In a final step it is necessary to measure the United States and German
positions against the provisions of UNCLOS. Although the United States
is not a party, it considers the provisions on passage rights and freedom of
107. Id. at 29.
108. Id. at 18–22.
109. Id. at 22.
110. Id.
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navigation reflect customary international law,111 which is binding on all
States.
1. Innocent Passage
According to UNCLOS Article 24(2), a “coastal State shall give appropriate
publicity to any danger to navigation, of which it has knowledge, within its
territorial sea.” This obligation is identical with the judgment in the Corfu
Channel case, but the legal basis is no longer the “general and wellestablished principles” upon which the Court relied. Rather, the basis as
applied to naval mines is found in UNCLOS Article 25(3), under which a
coastal State may, without discrimination in form or in fact among foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the
innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the
protection of its security, including weapons exercises. Such suspension
shall take effect only after having been duly published.

The U.S. and German positions on peacetime mining of a State’s own
territorial seas are in accord with the provisions of the two articles. While
Article 25(3) refers only to weapons exercises, that reference is not exclusive and both agree countries agree that the laying of armed mines is a danger to navigation that will result in a suspension of the right of innocent
passage in the area concerned, and that such minelaying must be notified.
Since the laying of controlled mines does not result in a suspension of the
right of innocent passage and since they do not pose a danger to navigation, their existence need not be notified either under UNCLOS Article
25(3) or Article 24(2). While stating that there is a right to lay mines in a
State’s own sovereign sea areas, both agree the right to lay armed mines
arises only when necessary to protect national security.
Unfortunately, both manuals are silent on the right of non-suspendable
innocent passage provided by Article 45. Given their countries’ acceptance
of the navigational provisions of UNCLOS as either treaty law (Germany)
or customary law (United States), it can be concluded, however, that neither is prepared to interfere with that right.
111. NWP 1-14M, supra note 58, ¶ 1.2. This position is illustrated in specific NWP 114 provisions addressing passage rights and freedom of navigation. See id., ¶¶ 2.5.2.1 (innocent passage), 2.5.3.1 (transit passage), 2.5.4.1 (archipelagic sea lanes passage), 2.6.3
(freedom of navigation in international waters).
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Finally, UNCLOS Article 52 provides the same rights to an archipelagic
State to suspend innocent passage in its archipelagic waters as those permitting suspension of innocent passage in the territorial sea. The U.S. position on the mining of territorial seas is equally applicable in archipelagic
waters and is consistent with Article 52.
2. Transit Passage and Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage
Under UNCLOS Articles 38(1) and 44 the right of transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage, respectively, may not be impeded, hampered
or suspended. The United States and Germany consider the laying of
armed mines within international straits and archipelagic sea lanes as irreconcilable with these obligations. Although not stated directly, the United
States appears to take the position that controlled mines may be laid in an
international strait and within an archipelagic sea lane. While it is conceded
that controlled mines do not pose a hazard to innocent shipping as long as
they are not armed, international shipping may refrain from navigating
through an international strait or utilize an archipelagic sea lane merely
because it is suspected that mines are present. Or even if proceeding
through the strait or sea lane, they may do so with extreme caution. If that
were to occur, transit and archipelagic passage could be delayed, thus “impeded”112 in contravention of Articles 38(1) and 44.
3. Freedom of Navigation in High Seas Areas
The international law of the sea does not prohibit military uses of the high
seas, including the EEZ and continental shelf of other States.113 Hence,
States are allowed to lay mines in those areas if they do not pose a danger
to international shipping.
As with the placement of mines in the territorial sea and archipelagic
waters, the United States distinguishes between armed and controlled
mines in the mining of international waters, approving the latter if there is
no unreasonable interference with other lawful uses of the oceans. With
regard to armed mines, the United States does not assert that there is authority to lay armed mines in international waters to further general national security interests nor does it base that authority on the law of the sea, but
112. For the meaning of the term “impede,” see supra note 77 and accompanying text.
113. See Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 4.
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cites the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as now set
forth in Article 51 of the UN Charter as providing the legal authority. Because UNCLOS was drafted with the intent of regulating uses of the sea in
peacetime, it does not address the exercise of the right of self-defense.
Moreover, the conditions under which the United States is prepared to lay
armed mines in international waters (prior notification, on-scene presence,
expeditious removal when the imminent threat has passed) conform to the
requirements of necessity, proportionality and immediacy, and are, therefore, in accordance with the limitations on the right of self-defense. There
are good reasons to believe that Germany is prepared to share that approach if naval mines are the only effective means to counter an imminent
threat.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The contemporary law of naval warfare and maritime neutrality has considerably strengthened the position of neutral States regarding their right to
continue to exercise freedom of navigation in general, and transit and archipelagic sea lanes passage rights in particular. The law has done so by
restricting the circumstances under which a belligerent State may employ
naval mines and providing enhanced authority to neutral States to enforce
navigational rights.
Although there is no prohibition on the mining of sea areas other than
those covered by the territorial sovereignty of neutral States, belligerents
are no longer entitled to unduly interfere with the freedom of navigation
enjoyed by neutral States in the high seas or with their rights of transit and
archipelagic sea lanes passage. While that is true as a general statement of
the law, the issue of mining of belligerent international straits and archipelagic sea lanes is not entirely settled.
In addition to restrictions placed on the laying of mines, contemporary
practice has established that neutral States may undertake self-help
measures in response to unlawful employment of mines. Thus, if a belligerent lays mines in violation of the restrictions provided for by the law of
naval warfare, aggrieved neutral States are entitled to remove the unlawfully
laid mines in order to enforce their navigational rights. The right of removing illegally laid mines is not limited to international waters, but also applies
in international straits and archipelagic waters even if the areas concerned
are part of the sovereign territory of the delinquent belligerent.
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While the law of naval warfare and maritime neutrality provide comparatively clear rules on the protection of innocent shipping against the
threats posed by naval mines during international armed conflicts, the situation is less clear when it comes to the legality of mining operations in
peacetime. So far only two States have indicated under what conditions
they consider such operations to be in accordance with international law.
According to both, peacetime mining is an exceptional right; they also
agree on the law applicable to mining a State’s own national waters. While
the United States has set forth the circumstances under which it believes
mining of international waters is permitted, the German position is not as
clear and may, in fact, differ from that of the United States. It cannot,
therefore, be currently claimed that international law provides established
and specific rules on the issue.
Rather, the legal yardstick to be applied in order to determine the legality of such operations is—and shall remain—the international law of the
sea, because this is the best approach to ensure continuing and effective
protection of international shipping that is so important to the world economy. This, of course, does not preclude an application of the jus ad bellum,
in particular the right of individual or collective self-defense, in specific
circumstances. Clearly, a State need not wait until it has been subjected to
an armed attack to respond; it may respond to an imminent armed attack
by laying mines, whether controlled or not, in international waters in the
exercise of its inherent right of self-defense.
Finally, the law applicable to naval mines recognizes how far mining
technology has advanced beyond that addressed in the 1907 Hague Convention VIII and accepts the distinction between armed and controlled
mines. Armed mines are indeed a “hidden menace,” both during international armed conflicts and in peacetime, and as such the rules and principles regulating their use recognize the danger presented to international
shipping and prohibits or restricts their use to alleviate this danger. Controlled mines, particularly in peacetime, but also when programmed during
armed conflict to hit only military objects, do not pose the same hazard to
international shipping. There are no restrictions on their use other than
those protecting the territorial sovereignty or certain well-established sovereign rights of other States.
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